The Prospects for a Palestinian State after Arafat

Introduction
The discourse about the Palestinian State and the need for a longstanding settlement between Israel and the Palestinians has been in the agenda of the regional leaders and of the United Nation for more than half century. Many formulas have been advanced, all of them designed under the consideration of a one state or two-state solutions. Since the signature of the Oslo accord, between the Israeli government and the Palestinian National Authority, the two-state solution has dominated and was again refueled with the divulgation of the Road Map for peace in April 2003. This is to say that any actual exercise on the possibilities of a Palestinian state, must consider the Oslo accord and the Road map as the starting points.

The aim of this work is to elaborate about the prospects of a Palestinian state after Arafat. Specifically, is Arafat’s absence going to prompt the establishment of an autonomous and sovereign Palestinian state?

The question is a little bit misleading due to its suggestion that Arafat was an Obstacle for a final settlement between Israel and Palestine which, in our view, is not true. We are not suggesting any casual relationship because we consider that the obstacles are not only in the people on power but also, and mostly, on the issues like borders, Jerusalem and refugees. Arafat is used only as a chronological mark, although not to be totally neglected. Meaning that the obstacle is not the person himself but the way he addresses those ‘final status negotiation’ issues. This being the case, we contend that (i) under the present conditions of power balance, between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, we can not expect any independent and sovereign Palestinian State and, (ii) any guarantee for an independent and sovereign Palestinian state pre requires a balanced solution of the ‘old’ questions of Jerusalem, borders and refugees

1. Framework for a Palestinian State
1.1 Oslo Agreement
The Oslo agreement can be considered as the first frame upon which both Israelis and Palestinians, with the help of the international community, can shape a final peace agreement. The Declaration of Principles presented in 1993 committed the parties to a solution based on the United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, both of them issued by the Security Council after the 1967 and 1973 wars respectively[1]. The 242 and 338 resolutions had long called on Israel to leave the occupied territories in return for a recognition from and peace with its neighbors.

The main historical relevance of the agreement is symbolized by the fact that it represented the first time “that Israel and the Palestinians have met, recognized each other, and formally and irrevocably […] committed themselves to a commonly defined path for peace.”[2] In fact, the Oslo’s merit was its role on, at least, breaking the myths that induced both sides into mutual denial for about half century. The second merit of this accord was the impact it had in the ground for bringing an entity that, for the first time, was going to conduct the destinies of the Palestinians. The establishment of a Palestinian political entity based on the Palestinian soil to perform those basic functions of any state – education, health, habitation and sanitation – was supposed to represent the real step toward the realization of the expected Palestinian state.

However, this mission was going to prove itself not easy due to the emergence or prevalence of major challenges within the Palestinian territories of West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The most salient of those challenges was the failure of the Palestinian Authority to stabilize itself within the territories and to mobilize the support of all the Palestinians into its guidance. Amongst the outsiders were the influential radical military groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad favoring a zero sum solution for the conflict. According to Kass, “The [Palestinian] Islamic groups Hamas and the IJM [Islamic Jihad] are made up of total rejectionists who unequivocally deny Israelis to exist because Islamic Jurisprudence expressly forbids usurpation of Muslim land and/or the imposition of infidels’ authority over Muslims.”[3] Under this situation, the failure of the Palestinian Authority to bring those radical groups into control weakened its own position in the eyes of Israel since it was labeled as being incapable of controlling its own population and to create the necessary security conditions to further negotiations for a possible total handover or, as we want it, “…genuine progress toward the two-state plan envisioned by the Oslo peace process”[4]

The fact that the Oslo agreement was vague in interpretation and not conclusive in terms of the steps forward, made Guyatt conclude that “four years after the signing of the Declaration of Principle, […] Israel had succeeded in withdrawing from the most populous Palestinian areas, and had consolidated its grasp on the remaining territory of the West Bank.”[5] However, “if Palestinians had hoped that the momentum of a peace process would force Israel to end its occupation and recognize its Palestinian neighbors, the experience of Oslo proved that such an outcome was fantastical.”[6] In fact, terrorist attacks continued inside Israel, repression of Palestinians by Israelis escalated and the construction of settlements accelerated worsening the situation in the occupied territories and distorting the possibilities of a lasting peace. A new or renewal of the commitment for peace was being called into action.

1.2 The Road Map
The second most salient attempt to forge a long lasting peace that could, eventually, result in a Palestinian State was presented in April 2003 – the Road Map – which, although presented by the United States, it is under the eyes of the quartet which also includes the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia. It also emphasizes the two-state solution and, differently from the Oslo Accord, it includes clear phases, timings and objective targets. We can consider it as a plan of action for the realization and improvement of what have been agreed ten years ago in Oslo. Its primary idea is to bring about the final status of the Israeli Palestinian conflict and thus a Palestinian State by 2005. However, as Kathleen views the plan, “in the end, the Road Map failed because its conception was flawed. Because it was written ultimately for Israelis benefit, it allowed Israel to continue colonizing the occupied territories while prohibiting any Palestinian resistance.”[7]

At its birth, the Road Map was qualified as a performance-based process in the sense that its implementation would proceed according to the fulfillment of previously established tasks. It is a phased plan which phase I was supposed to bring an end to terrorism and violence, the normalization of Palestinian life and the building of the Palestinian institutions. The second phase is supposed to be a transitional phase with the Palestinians enjoying ‘provisional sovereignty’ and ‘provisional borders’. It then moves to the third phase that will put an end to the conflict and will testimony the emergence of a totally independent Palestinian state.[8] However this plan was heavily criticized due to, for example, its omission over the settlements established in the West Bank before 2001 and most importantly due to the fact that it gives the real onus to the Palestinian Authority which must keep showing work (security, democratization) while the other side is entitled to cooperate which gives the Israelis the space of maneuver to maintain and expand occupation in ‘strategic’ places.

Given the American softness in relation to Israel and pressures put over the Palestinians to prove, with fewer resources, that they are capable of delivering, some voices raised to denounce the lack of the American commitment to a balanced solution. As Christison puts it, Bush launched the Road Map “…in 2003 because, in his World view and that of the neoconservatives who influence him, this seemed the next logical step in the ‘transformation’ of the Middle East envisioned to follow the war in Iraq – a transformation designed in large part to ensure Israel’s regional hegemony by removing any threats from the Palestinians and other Arabs.”[9]

In this case, from the degree of concessions enjoyed by Israel and the kind of pressures under the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinians, it is easy to see that the peace process is not balanced and thus unexpected that the Palestinian Authority will accomplish its tasks in time to permit the emergence of a viable and independent Palestinian state by 2005 as previously scheduled under the Road Map timeframe.

As a way to refuel the process and to evaluate the performance on the implementation of the peace plan, a meeting took place at the Egyptian resort of Sharm El Sheik bringing together representatives of the quartet and both sides in the beginning of 2005. In recent remarks, the Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nasir al Kidwa, referred to the Sharm El Sheik understanding as progressive since “Israel finally made the commitment that was made earlier by the Palestinians with regard to the cessation of all acts of violence against Israelis.”[10] The cessation or reduction of Israelis violent actions “opened the way for some additional actions on the Palestinian side and allowed us effectively to reach an agreement with all Palestinian factions.”[11]

2. Unsolved ‘Old’ Issues
There are, at least, three main issues which the failure to solve them, have been the main cause for the constant delays of the final settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians: the status of Jerusalem, the placement of borders and the question of refugees.

Jerusalem was a divided city before the conflict of 1967 and it felt under the control of Israel in the afterwards of the conflict. It constitutes an issue of major concern in the Israeli Palestinian negotiations due to the radicalism of positions over it. Precisely, while the Israeli side insists on a non divided Jerusalem and thus evoking the right for total control of the city, on one side, on the other side, the Palestinians demand a share in Jerusalem by invoking their historical rights over the city and, most interestingly, they are looking to establish the capital of the future state of Palestine in the East Jerusalem.

The deliberations of the Oslo accord are vague in relation to the issue of Jerusalem and according to Guyatt, “the reason for this exclusion is that Israel does not recognize its occupation of Arab East Jerusalem as a temporary one, which at least it has done in some parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.”[12]It is to say that Jerusalem has been, virtually, given a ‘permanent status’ and Israelis assumes themselves as the legitimate runners of the city. However, the issue is much more complicated since this city is symbolic for the three monotheistic religions and in this particular case, Jewish people and Muslims are persuading the respective leaderships that their states could only be run from Jerusalem. As a way to show their determination in relation to Jerusalem, the Palestinians, for example, passed a constitution which states, in the fourth article, that “Jerusalem shall be the capital of the State of Palestine and the seat of its public authorities.”[13]

The second ‘old’ issue is related to the refugees. In fact, people who were forced to leave Palestine either due to the direct conflicts (1948 and 1967), or due to the general status of violence in the region, have been an issue of concern for both sides with the Palestinian Authority calling for the return of those people or the second generation while the Israelis reject such appeal. The landmark resolution 242 of 1967 did not mention any defined mechanism talking only about the necessity for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem. At the Oslo accord this issue was virtually transformed into a ‘final status issue’ with Israel reluctant to bring about the issue which remained a taboo. The blackout over this issue frustrated the expectations of those Palestinians outside by the time of Oslo since they hoped for a peace reality that could enable them to return home.

The third ‘old’ issue of concern is the definition of the borders. The radicalism over this issue is due to the fact that the United Nations resolutions 242 and 338 calls, amongst many things, for Israel to leave the occupied territories, a disposition used by the Palestinians to support their position and that, if carried out, could take Israeli’s borders back to the status that prevailed before the conflict of 1967. However, a change was made by Israel and the United States on the interpretation of the United Nations Resolution, arguing that the 242 resolution “urged Israel to leave not ‘the occupied territories’ but simply ‘occupied territories’, a semantic evasion which might allow Israel to give back all of the West Bank and Gaza or a mere fraction of it.”[14]In addition, Israel uses the need for secure borders to support its pretensions of keeping most of the occupied territories. This difference of position over the issue of borders has been recently fueled with the inclusion of an article in the new Palestinian Constitution stating that “Palestine is an independent state with full sovereignty, of a republican form of government. Its territory is an indivisible unit based upon its borders on the 4th of June 1967 and its territorial water, without prejudice to the international resolutions relative to Palestine”[15]

3. The Yasser Arafat Factor
The fact that the Road Map places a great responsibility into the Palestinian leadership to control violence as well as calls for the implementation of internal democratic reforms, in the Palestinian Authority, can be an indication of how much particularly the American leadership regarded the Palestinian leadership as an obstacle for peace and for a definitive settlement between Israel and Palestine.

Arafat was the incarnation of such leadership and he agreed to appoint an interim primer ministry as a sign of a willingness to implement internal reforms. However, we consider that blaming Arafat for the stagnation of peace process implementation is misleading and reduces the approach of the whole problem. Arafat was not the problem. He was a leader representing people with aspirations and expectations over the approach he could have to the critical issues of refugees, Jerusalem and borders and he could not compromise on those issues without any assurance that similar concessions would be made by the Israeli side. Few people would compromise on them particularly if their solution represents at the same time the shape of the future state. So, renewing the same radical position was strategically needed for Arafat to (i) keep the flag of a Palestinian state up and (ii) mobilize the support and get legitimization from his social bases.

Although considering that the new Palestinian leadership would be more open to compromise, Arafat’s replacement means nothing if not followed by a similar moderation on the Israeli side. It would be difficult for the Palestinian Authority to justify softness before its population if not followed by the same behavior from the Israelis. Again, the point is not the people in power but, essentially, the way how they address critical issues.

4. The Actual Status of Palestine
By this time, under the road map time schedule, we were supposed to have been shown the outline for a ‘viable’ Palestinian state. On the contrary, Israel is adopting contradictory behavior that reduces the expectation about a viable, independent and sovereign Palestinian state. In fact if on one side Israel is withdrawing and reducing its presence from the Gaza Strip, on the other side, it is expanding its settlements in the West Bank in a process of balkanization of the Palestinian territories, as well as, proceeding with the construction of the separation wall that will virtually besiege any forthcoming Palestinian state. The withdrawal from Gaza is being accompanied by a clear process of “dispossession of the Palestinians [in the West Bank], which intensified with the start of the Intifada more than three years ago and is now bringing about the slow dismemberment of the population.[16] Although the implementation of the Road Map is a phased process, the withdrawal from Gaza Strip accompanied by expansion and consolidation in the West Bank raises some concerns if moving from Gaza Strip will not be the first and at the same time the last move resulting, in this way, in a no further move to the negotiation of the final status issues (borders, refugees and Jerusalem).

The ‘defense’ wall and the new settlements in the West Bank are of major concern for the Palestinians and Lagerquist observes that “within the maze of enclosures and exclusions, the Palestinians stand to retain between 48 and 53 percent of the West Bank, depending on the settler lobbying for additional fence extension. Some 395.000 Palestinians will be isolated outside the ‘cantons,’ including 225.000 in occupied East Jerusalem. Moreover, between 595.000 and 717.000 – a third of the West Bank Population – stands to loose access to their cultivated lands.”[17] This suggests a conspiracy Israeli plan, out of the Road Map, to establish itself in the disputed territories so when the time for the final handover comes, there will be few things or nothing, for Palestine, to discuss than accepting the conditions unilaterally created by Israel. An interesting reading of the situation by Sussman suggests that “the policy of settlement expansion since the signing of the Oslo accords has in effect created a single state geography”[18]

On the other side, we find that the Palestinian Authority has started to implement its share of the Road Map starting with the nomination of an interim premier ministry (a task done by Arafat), the drafting of a Constitution for the forthcoming state, the realization of election that brought the actual president of the Palestinian Authority into power and preparations for legislative elections are in progress. The Palestinian Authority has also managed to control or calm down the radical groups like Hamas so it can expect Israel to behave in the same way.
Economically, Palestine is almost integrated into the Israeli economic system. The Protocol of Paris, signed in 1995 between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, can be considered as the economic side of the Oslo agreement since it is intended to regulate the economic relations between both countries and most importantly allowed Israel to exert a control over the Palestinian imports. Since the Palestinians do not have any kind of control over the borders, it has been difficult for them to develop meaningful trade relations with the external World. As compensation, if not tool of control, Israel collects the import taxes for the goods going to the Palestinian territories and then directs this collected money to the Palestinian Authority. This situation means the Palestinians have to depend on the transferences from Israel to run their administrative functions and provide basic services for the population.

5. Instead of a Conclusion: a Possible Palestinian State
The two-state solution is the dominant approach and both sides have agreed on this solution. However, the design of the borders is still a sensitive aspect with both parts having different positions. Nasir Kidwa, the Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, agrees with the solution but add that “a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, with any adjustment being subject to agreement through negotiations between the two sides based on the principle of equal exchange of territory.”[19]This point is also clear in the article 1 of the Palestinian Constitution. Anyway, the possibility of a viable Palestinian state will be heavily determined by the course or conclusion to be reached on the negotiation of the ‘final status issues’ and most importantly on the sketch of the borders.

As Counsell puts it, “any viable state must be contiguous, have free borders, and sovereignty over its natural resources and airspace”.[20]However, we are skeptical about the Israeli disposition to remove the settlements or deconstruct the defense wall in the near future. Thus, if a Palestinian state is to emerge from the actual conditions it will be a weak state, at the outset. This is because all the previous accords have been superficial about almost everything and given its relative power, Israel managed to take the advantages. The result is that everything that the Palestinians have achieved so far, have been decided by Israel and this Israeli power, of deciding about what goes and what doesn’t go to the Palestinians, is not likely to reduce.

So, under the present configurations an emerging Palestinian state would be constituted by some pieces of land most of them isolated between themselves, with no sovereign rights over the borders nor over strategic resources like water and airspace, with no place to accommodate the refugees, a state besieged by thousands of Jewish settlers and a huge defense wall restricting peoples circulation, a state dependent on Israel for its own security and finally economically integrated, as a consumer, into the Israeli economic system.

The above description takes us to conclude that under the actual conditions there is not any possibility that we can expect the emergence of a viable, independent and sovereign Palestinian state. Since the Palestinians have been left for their own by most of their neighbors and there is no easy way to increase their bargaining position, they must prove skillfulness in the final negotiations and it means, at least, the fulfillment of their tasks presented under the Road Map.


Bibliography
Bisharah, Marwan (2002) – Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid Occupation, Terrorism and the Future; Zed Books; New York
Brown, Nathan (2002) – The Palestinian Reform Agenda; U.S Institute of Peace; Washington
Christison, Kathleeen (2004) – “All Those Old Issues”: George W. Bush and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict; Journal of Palestine Studies; Vol. 34, No. 2’ winter; pp.36-50

Counsell, Benjamin (2003) – “Bypass Roadmap” in Al Ahram Weekly; 29 May – 04 June

Guyatt, Nicholas (1998) – The Absence of Peace. Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict; Zed Books; London

Kass, Ilan and Bard O’Neil (1997) – The Deadly Embrace: The Impact of Israeli and Palestinian Rejectionism on the Process; Lanham; London

Khalidi, Ahmed S. (1995) – The Palestinians: Current Dilemmas, Future Challenges; Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2, winter; pp. 5-13
Khalidi, Walid – ‘The Prospects for Peace in the Middle East’; Journal of Palestine Studies; winter 2003, issue 126
Roy, Sara (2004) – The Palestinian State: Division and Despair; Current History; January; pp.31-36

Lagerquist, Peter (2004) – Fencing the Last Sky: Excavating Palestine after Israel’s ‘Separation Wall’; Journal of Palestine Studies; Vol.33, winter; pp. 5-35

Sussman, Gary (2004) – Is the Two-State Solution Dead?; Current History; January; pp. 37-42
Other Documents and Resources from the Internet

Declaretion of Principles
The Palestinia Constitution; available online at: http://www.mopic.gov.ps/constitution/
The Road Map; available online at: http://www.un.org/News/dh/mideast/roadmap122002.pdf
[1] Declaration of Principles, Article 1
[2] Khalidi, Ahmed S. (1995) – The Palestinians: Current Dilemmas, Future Challenges; Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 Winter; p. 6
[3] Kass, Ilan and Bard O’Neil (1997) – The Deadly Embrance, The Impact of Isreali and Palestinian Rejectionism on the Process; Lanham; London; p. 226
[4] Sussman, Gary (2004) – Is the Two-State Solution Dead?; Current History; January; p.37
[5] Guyatt, Nicholas (1998) - The Absence of Peace. Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict; Zed Books; London; p.42
[6] ibid.
[7] Christison, Kathleen (2004) – “All Those Old Issues”: George W. Bush and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict; Journal of Palestine Studies; Vol. 34, No. 2’ winter; p.40
[8] The Road Map; available online at : http://www.un.org/News/dh/mideast/roadmap122002.pdf
[9] op cit. pp.48
[10] Kidwa’s recent remarks in the United States accompanying the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on his visit to Washington, May 25-27, 2005. a full text is available online at: http://www.fmep.org/analysis/alKidwa_5_25_05.html
[11] ibid.
[12] Guyatt, Nicholas – op cit. p.124
[13] The Palestinian Constitution; article 4; available online at: http://www.mopic.gov.ps/constitution/
[14] Guyatt, Nicholas – op cit. pp. 29-30
[15] Op cit.; article 1
[16] Roy, Sara (2004) – The Palestinian State: Division and Despair; Current History; January; p.31
[17] Lagerquist, Peter (2004) – Fencing the Last Sky: Excavating Palestine after Israel’s ‘Separation Wall’; Journal of Palestine Studies; Vol.33, winter; p.13
[18] Sussman, Gary – op cit. p.38
[19] Kadwa; op.cit.
[20] Counsell, Benjamin – “ Bypass Roadmap” in Al Ahram Weekly; 29 May – 04 June 2003